Philosophy

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This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

Research outputs are organized by type (eg. Master Thesis, Article, Conference Paper).

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Now showing 1 - 20 of 139

Logic in Pictures: An Examination of Diagrammatic Representations, Graph Theory and Logic
(University of Waterloo, 1994) Hawley, Derik
This thesis explores the various forms of reasoning that are associated with diagrams. It does this by a logical analysis of diagrammatic symbols. The thesis is divided into three sections dealing with different aspects of diagrammatic logic. They are (1) The relevance of diagrammatic symbols and their role in logic, (2) Methods of formalizing diagrammatic symbols, such as subway maps and Peirce's Existential Graphs through the means of Graph theory, (3) The conception of inference in diagrammatic logic systems.
Occurrent Contractarianism: A Preference-Based Ethical Theory
(University of Waterloo, 1995) Murray, Malcolm
There is a problem within contractarian ethics that I wish to resolve. It concerns individualpreferences. Contractarianism holds that morality, properly conceived, can satisfy individualpreferences and interests better than amorality or immorality. W hat is unclear, however, iswhether these preferences are those individuals actually hold or those that they should hold. The goal of my thesis is to investigate this question. I introduce a version of contractarian ethicsthat relies on ind ividual preferences in a manner more stringent than has been in the literatureto date.
An Inquiry into Mental Variation
(University of Waterloo, 1995) Kujundzic, Nebojsa
Although there are both common and specialised senses of the term variation, (the OED lists dozens) there seems to be no well defined use of this term in philosophy. The main task of my thesis is to demonstrate that variation can be defined as a cognitive technique. I suggest that variation has been frequently used by philosophers, although not always in an overt manner. Moreover, I attempt to show that it is reasonable to talk about the relative importance of variation by examining the role of variation in Locke's Essay, Husserl's and Reinach's phenomenology, cognitive science, and thought experiments.
Conservative Contractarianism
(University of Waterloo, 2004) Watson, Terrence
Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance.
Exploring the Justifications for Human Rights
(University of Waterloo, 2005) Christelis, Angela
In this paper the concept of a ?human right? is analysed and clarified. Some justifications for human rights ? such as natural rights theory, contractarianism, utilitarianism and rights as vital interests ? are explored with respect to their emphasis on rights as protected choices or protected interests. Finally, a vital interests view is defended in which the rights to subsistence, security, and liberty of movement and political participation form the set of our basic rights without which we cannot enjoy our other rights.
Rigid Designation, the Modal Argument, and the Nominal Description Theory
(University of Waterloo, 2005) Isenberg, Jillian
In this thesis, I describe and evaluate two recent accounts of naming. These accounts are motivated by Kripke?s response to Russell?s Description Theory of Names (DTN). Particularly, I consider Kripke?s Modal Argument (MA) and various arguments that have been given against it, as well as Kripke?s responses to these arguments. Further, I outline a version of MA that has recently been presented by Scott Soames, and consider how he responds to the criticisms that the argument faces. In order to evaluate the claim that MA is decisive against all description theories, I outline the Nominal Description Theory (NDT) put forth by Kent Bach and consider whether it constitutes a principled response to MA. I do so by exploring how Bach both responds to Kripke?s arguments against descriptivism and highlights the problems with rigid designation as a purely semantic thesis. Finally, I consider the relative merits of the accounts put forth by Bach and Soames. Upon doing so, I argue that MA is not as decisive against description theories as it has long been thought to be. In fact, NDT seems to provide a better account of our uses of proper names than the rigid designation thesis as presented by Kripke and Soames.
Sentimentalism, Affective Response, and the Justification of Normative Moral Judgments
(University of Waterloo, 2006) Menken, Kyle
Sentimentalism as an ethical view makes a particular claim about moral judgment: to judge that something is right/wrong is to have a sentiment/emotion of approbation/disapprobation, or some kind of positive/negative feeling, toward that thing. However, several sentimentalists have argued that moral judgments involve not only having a specific kind of feelings or emotional responses, but judging that one would be justified in having that feeling or emotional response. In the literature, some authors have taken up the former position because the empirical data on moral judgment seems to suggest that justification is not a necessary prerequisite for making a moral judgment. Even if this is true, however, I argue that justifying moral judgments is still an important philosophic endeavour, and that developing an empirically constrained account of how a person might go about justifying his feelings/emotional responses as reasons for rendering (normative) moral judgments by using a coherentist method of justification is both plausible and desirable.
Rationality and Group Decision-Making in Practical Healthcare
(University of Waterloo, 2006) Heffernan, Courtney
In this paper, a view of non-compliance in practical healthcare is provided that identifies certain non-compliant behaviours as rational. This view of rational non-compliance is used to update a current form of doctor patient relationships with the aim of reducing non-compliance. In addition to reforming one standard doctor patient relationship model, the normative implications of understanding non-compliance as a rational form of human behaviour are described.
Naturalizing Moral Judgment
(University of Waterloo, 2006-12-18T15:53:55Z) Pecoskie, Theresa K.
Philosophers have traditionally attempted to solve metaethical disputes about the nature of moral judgment through reasoned argument alone. Empirical evidence about how we do make moral judgments is often overlooked in these debates. In the wake of recent discoveries in cognitive neuroscience and experimental psychology, however, some empirically-minded philosophers are beginning to use neural findings in support of their theories of moral judgment. The intent of this thesis is to explore how this empirical evidence can be integrated effectively into philosophical discussions about moral judgment. In the first chapter of my thesis, I review the moral judgment debate in both philosophy and moral psychology, focusing specifically on contemporary sentimentalist solutions to this problem. This review sets the stage for my critique of Prinz’s sentimentalist account of moral judgment in the second chapter. I argue that Prinz uses neural evidence to support his sentimentalist thesis inappropriately, altering the evidence to fit his theory, rather than using the evidence to inform his theory. In the third chapter, I examine Prinz’s somatic theory of emotion and how this is related to his theory of moral judgment. I argue that neural evidence indicates that a theory of emotion that incorporates aspects of both cognitive appraisal and somatic theories is more empirically accurate than either view in isolation. Finally, I discuss the implications that a neural account of emotion could have on future debates about the nature of moral judgment.
Merleau-Ponty and the Preconceptions of Objective Thinking
(University of Waterloo, 2007-01-18T14:20:43Z) Al-Khalaf, Hanan
Maurice Merleau-Ponty thinks that many classical theories of perception, especially reductionism, are influenced by the objective and the scientific form of thinking. Such influence is expressed in two preconceptions. The first preconception is that perception is reduced to units such as “impressions”. The meaning of these units is considered to be a representation of the world. The second preconception is that such perceptual meaning is caused by the world and the living being is passive in its relation to such constitution of meaning. In my view, the results of Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these two preconceptions constitute his two main concepts: the phenomenal body and the perceptual meaning determined by the structural relation with the world. Despite the fact that some traces of these preconceptions can be found in the introduction of Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, there is no straight argument that shows how he approached these two results from the rejection of these two preconceptions. My thesis is to present Merleau-Ponty’s view on the phenomenal body based on his criticism of the two preconceptions described above. In my view, Merleau-Ponty’s criticism of these preconceptions can be traced through his argument against Gestalt psychology, associationism, and behavioral associationism.
The Philosophy of Bioinformatics
(University of Waterloo, 2007-01-22T16:40:33Z) Mikhael, Joseph
The development of bioinformatics as an influential biological field should interest philosophers of biology and philosophers of science in general. Bioinformatics contributes significantly to the development of biological knowledge using a variety of scientific methods. Particular tools used by bioinformaticists, such as BLAST, phylogenetic tree creation software, and DNA microarrays, will be shown to utilize the scientific methods of extended cognition, analogical reasoning, and representations of mechanisms. Extended cognition is found in bioinformatics through the use of computer databases and algorithms in the representation and development of scientific theories in bioinformatics. Analogical reasoning is found in bioinformatics through particular analogical comparisons that are made between biological sequences and operations. Lastly, scientific theories that are created using certain bioinformatics tools are often representations of mechanisms. These methods are found in other scientific fields, but it will be shown that these methods are expanded in bioinformatics research through the use of computers to make the methods of analogical reasoning and representation of mechanisms more powerful.
Human Nature and Morality: An invesitgation of the evidence for and implications of genetically-based moral traits
(University of Waterloo, 2007-09-10T13:03:29Z) Martin, Bruce Carruthers
In his recent book, Moral Minds, Marc Hauser claims that humans are genetically endowed with a moral faculty operating in much the same way as our linguistic faculty, and that this faculty delimits normative moral systems. Further, he states that this work represents the beginning of what will become a science of morality. These claims contrast sharply with the conception of human nature presupposed by many of the dominant Western moral theories. For the most part, these conceptions of human nature are not flattering: they suggest that our natural instincts, in large part, or in whole, are not conducive to living a moral life. Given these presuppositions, such theories typically call for setting aside our natural instincts when determining the basis upon which normative moral theory should be established. This thesis seeks to show that there is a middle ground between these two views. On my account, recent scientific learning about innate traits impacting our behaviour towards others can be employed to construct a conception of human nature that is at odds with that used by a number of the dominant Western moral theories. As the impact of such innate traits is constrained by our analytic intellect, however, I argue that views such as Hauser’s overstate the implications for normative moral theory.
A Defense of Semantic Conventionalism
(University of Waterloo, 2007-09-26T19:24:46Z) Davies, Nancy
The purpose of this dissertation is to argue that semantic conventionalism of a, more or less, Dummettian variety is unjustly neglected in contemporary philosophy. The strategy for arguing this is to make a conjecture about why people ignore it; there seem to be two plausible reasons: 1) there are (what people take to be) obviously preferable candidates on offer; 2) there are (what people take to be) knock-down arguments against semantic conventionalism. In response to 1), I consider intentionalist Gricean semantics, and argue it is at least no better off than conventionalist theories. Of course, any number of theories could be used oppose semantic conventionalism. But the Gricean theory is seen as particularly strong, and showing that it is no better off makes my case for the viability of semantic conventionalism all the more compelling. For 2) I consider three possible reasons for thinking that conventionalism has been refuted. Chapter Three concerns the objection that semantic conventionalism depends on the existence of ``luminous'' psychological states, of which there are none (according to Williamson's anti-luminosity argument). I agree with Williamson, and reject luminosity as part of a viable conventionalist theory. Chapter Four supposes that semantic conventionalist theories depend on the (untenable) analytic/synthetic distinction to avoid collapse into holism. However, I also reject the analytic/synthetic distinction for a more favourable distinction. In Chapter Five, the objection I consider is that semantic conventionalism involves an epistemically constrained notion of truth and so collapses into incoherence because of the knowability paradox. However, my response to this is that the semantic conventionalist should be happy with such an epistemic account of truth and that it does not lead to the knowability paradox. The paradox can, and is, resolved in this chapter. So, (1) and (2) are false. The concluding chapter brings together all that we have learned throughout the dissertation about what a defensible version of conventionalism might look like.
The Measure Of Meaning
(University of Waterloo, 2007-09-27T14:00:32Z) Pollon, Simon Carl
There exists a broad inclination among those who theorize about mental representation to assume that the meanings of linguistic units, like words, are going to be identical to, and work exactly like, mental representations, such as concepts. This has the effect of many theorists applying facts that seem to have been discovered about the meanings of linguistic units to mental representations. This is especially so for causal theories of content, which will be the primary exemplars here. It is the contention of this essay that this approach is mistaken. The influence of thinking about language and mental representation in this way has resulted in the adoption of certain positions by a broad swathe of theorists to the effect that the content of a concept is identical to the property in the world that the concept represents, and that because of this a concept only applies to an object in the world or it does not. The consequences of such commitments are what appear to be insoluble problems that arise when trying to account for, or explain, misrepresentation in cognitive systems. This essay presents the position that in order to actually account for misrepresentation, conceptual content must be understood as being very much like measurements, in that the application of a content to an object in the world is akin to measuring said object, and that conceptual content ought be understood as being graded in the same way that measurements are. On this view, then, concepts are the kinds of things that can be applied more, or less, accurately to particular objects in the world, and so are not identical to whatever it is that they represent.
Igniting the Deontic Consequence Relation: Dilemmas, Trumping, and the Naturalistic Fallacy
(University of Waterloo, 2007-09-27T14:41:16Z) Holukoff, Kurt
In this work, Kurt Holukoff examines three formal approaches to representing valid inferences in reasoning regarding obligation and its cognates: deontic logic. He argues that an appropriate formalization of deontic logic should take genuine moral dilemmas seriously, be capable of representing trumping-like reasoning, and not make the naturalistic fallacy valid as a matter of logic. The three systems he investigates are, the Standard Deontic logic, a Relevant Deontic logic, and Schotch and Jennings’ multiple moral accessibility relations Deontic logic. The Standard Deontic logic has seemingly insurmountable problems representing both fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and trumping-like reasoning. Moreover, the naturalistic fallacy is valid in the Standard Deontic logic. The Relevant deontic logic that the author examines is capable of representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations and does not make valid the naturalistic fallacy. However, the author argues that the Relevant deontic logic needs some revisions in order to represent trumping-like reasoning. Likewise, the author finds that Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic is capable of representing fruitful reasoning from an inconsistent set of obligations. However, in order to represent trumping-like reasoning, revisions to Schotch and Jennings’ Deontic logic are apparently required. Similar revisions are seemingly required to block the naturalistic fallacy, which is otherwise valid in Schotch and Jennings’ original system.
Individual Human Rights: Reconciling Rights with Value Pluralism
(University of Waterloo, 2007-10-01T15:43:53Z) Haddow, Neil Corwyn
Abstract: This thesis examines the foundations of individual human rights. The general thought that informs the discussion is that rights and values are two different kinds of moral discourse. Hence, any attempt to simply state rights in value terms will be problematic because the agent-relative character of values does not lend itself to grounding/ explaining interpersonal rules, like rights. The thesis outlines agent-relative values, showing their plausibility, and then proceeds to show how rights perform a different function. The attempt to move from talk about what is right to what rights we have is termed the ‘moralist fallacy’. Rights are kinds of restrictions that others face on their actions when they are promoting their own good. Axiology is about how best to achieve one’s objective agent-relative good; so values involve trade offs and calculations agents can perform about what is in their best interest, while rights are not open to trade offs and calculations because they are restrictions that agents face when they are pursuing their own good. The main problem the thesis discerns is how rights can be concerned with protecting the concerns of others when what people legitimately care about are their own concerns. Two different views of the motivational legitimacy of rights are examined—the agent well being view and the agent-recipient view. On the former, rights are motivationally appealing and justified because abiding by them can be shown to be part of what constitutes an agent’s (who is subject to abiding by rights) well being; on the latter view, abiding by rights constitutes part of the recipient’s (who has the rights) well being. Taken separately these two views are problematic. Rights legitimacy would seem to require something from both views. But since these views are contraries they do not seem open to combination either. The thesis will attempt to provide a solution to reconciling the agent well being and agent recipient views while trying to retain the nature of rights as restrictions not open to trade offs or reducible to value talk. Rights function as restrictions, but why do they function this way and how are they justified when what people are mostly concerned with is their own agent-relative good? Rights must be a separate kind of moral claim, not reducible to talk about what values we have in order for rights to have the motivational and justificatory strength they need for interpersonal validity and to resist paternalist interferences. Rights will have this strength if they are based on something that all value pursuers require—such as recognition of one’s legitimate claim to possess oneself. First possession based on first come, first serve will provide legitimacy for a system of rights because it will appeal to and motivate agents by relating rights-respect to their well being. I will argue that abiding by others’ rights is in one’s best interest because doing so is a wise choice—while one might believe that not abiding by others’ rights might give one the best outcome, one cannot be sure about this and so ought to choose to abide by rights as a general policy. Also, agents ought to make sure that they voice their concerns over rights violations of others. Even though this may not be to their immediate benefit, it is rational for agents to speak out on this issue and reinforce rights–respecting behaviour because making the system effective will ultimately be in their own long-term self-interest. The thesis also tries to make sense of how rights are compossible and when rights might face thresholds beyond which they no longer hold.
Reference and Reinterpretation
(University of Waterloo, 2007-10-02T15:22:14Z) Kulic, Anthony
Reference is the relation held to obtain between an expression and what a speaker or thinker intends the expression to represent. Reference is a component of interpretation, the process of giving terms, sentences, and thoughts semantic content. An example of reference in a formal context involves the natural numbers, where each one can be taken to have a corresponding set-theoretic counterpart as its referent. In an informal context reference is exemplified by the relation between a name and the specific name-bearer when a speaker or thinker utters or has the name in mind. Recent debates over reference have concerned the mechanism of reference: How is it that we can refer? In informal contexts, externalists see the reference relation as explicable in terms of the salient causal relations involved in the naming of a thing, or a class of things, and the ensuing causal chains leading to a term’s use. Opponents of this view—internalists—see the reference relation as being conceptually direct, and they take the external approach to rely on untenable metaphysical assumptions about the world’s structure. Moreover, some internalists take the permutability—i.e. the consistent reinterpretation—of certain referential schemes to confound the externalist picture of reference. In this thesis I focus on the reference of theoretical terms in science, and I argue for an externalist treatment of natural kinds and other theoretical elements. Along the way I offer a defense of the externalist’s pre-theoretic metaphysical assumptions and emphasize their central role in the interpretation of scientific languages. The externalist approach acknowledges the necessary constraints on reference-fixing that account for the schemes we employ, and this, I argue, confounds the permutation strategy.
Education in the 21st Century: Human Rights and Individual Actions
(University of Waterloo, 2008-01-09T18:17:41Z) Lee, Sharon Elizabeth
This dissertation has three goals. The first goal is to outline how twentieth century advocates qualify education as a human right. The second goal is to offer an integrative account which argues that, to defend a right to education both the provision of educational resources and the freedom to do something with those resources must be taken into account. This requires more than the rhetoric of a UN document like the Convention on the Rights of the Child. It also requires more than the good intentions of duty-bound adults acting in the best interests of the child. To do this, it is necessary to consider how the institutional structure dedicated to education - in particular the structure dedicated to basic primary education to which the UN claims all children are entitled - integrates with the freedom each child has to do something with that basic primary education once he or she has obtained it. Finally, by identifying education as a human right within this integrative structure, this dissertation will demonstrate that, if policy documents related to education shift from a focus on the traditional relationship between an experienced adult and a dependent child to one based on the relationship between an individual and a capability set, the claim that education is a human right becomes a meaningful claim which can provide a justification for the social commitments required to recognize this claim.
Commercial and Business Incorporation: Enhancing the notion of corporation to include an ethical statement
(University of Waterloo, 2008-01-22T14:03:54Z) Ackroyd, Vaughan Richard
Today’s modern, Canadian, business corporations are hugely influential in determining public policy and many aspects of people’s lives. Because this influence permeates so much of our social construct, we expect corporations to act in an ethical manner. Yet, at the very baseline of legal incorporation, there is not a requirement for corporations, per se, to be ethical or to act in an ethical manner. This situation has set up a form of ethical dualism, with individual citizens being required to act in certain prescribed manners, while corporations, which in most cases comprise individual citizens, are allowed to ignore or even to flaunt similar ethical rules and standards. In this investigative paper on corporate applied ethics, I will examine arguments for and against the notion of including ethical responsibility statements within the concept of incorporation. This paper will provide a historical framework in which to view some of the complexities involved, and examine certain influential assertions made by Milton Friedman. The paper will begin with a look at what is meant by corporation in this context. This will be followed by an analysis of the arguments put forward by Milton Friedman in his famous essay “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits” and other related arguments. These other arguments, as objections to the inclusion of ethics within the notion of corporation, fall into three main types: objections to concept; to ability; and to process. I will review each in turn, with the hope that, by dispelling the Friedmanian arguments against corporate ethical inclusion, a new baseline for incorporation might be established. The second part of the paper will examine what kind of ethics might best suit the corporation. It will also consider ethical growth with respect to business. The paper will conclude with a suggestion as to how the inclusion of ethics within the notion of incorporation might be accomplished.
Explaining the Mind: The Embodied Cognition Challenge
(University of Waterloo, 2008-05-15T16:24:04Z) Zhitnik, Anatoly
This thesis looks at a relatively new line of research in Cognitive Science – embodied cognition. Its relation to the computational-representational paradigm, primarily symbolicism, is extensively discussed. It is argued that embodied cognition is compatible with the established paradigm but challenges its research focus and traditionally assumed segregation of cognition from bodily and worldly activities Subsequently the impact of embodied cognition on philosophy of Cognitive Science is considered. The second chapter defends the applicability of mechanistic explanation to cases of embodied cognition. Further, it argues that a proposed alternative, dynamic systems theory, is not a substitute to the mechanistic approach. The last chapter critically examines the thesis that mind is extended beyond the bodily boundary and into the world. It is concluded that arguments in favour of the extended mind thesis are inadequate. Considerations in favour of the orthodox view that the does not “leak” out into the world are also presented.

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