Philosophy

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This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

Research outputs are organized by type (eg. Master Thesis, Article, Conference Paper).

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Agency and Autonomy: A New Direction for Animal Ethics
(University of Waterloo, 2014-01-21) Evans, Natalie
The main problem addressed in animal ethics is on what grounds and to what extent we owe animals moral consideration. I argue that many animals deserve direct moral consideration in virtue of their agency, selfhood and autonomy. I start by providing an account of agency and selfhood that admits of degrees, from minimal to complex, among animal species that is supported by current research on consciousness and the mental capacities of animals. I posit that agency and selfhood are morally valuable as they allow for subjective mental experiences that matter to conscious individuals. I then develop a view of autonomy that corresponds to my view of agency and selfhood, whereby the degree to which an individual is self-aware indicates the degree to which that being is autonomous. I argue that autonomy not only consists in the rational and reflective capacities of humans, but also at a more minimal level where autonomy is simply the ability to make choices. I support this view of autonomy as choice with an account of ‘naturalized autonomy’ and explain some of the implications of this view for animals. After considering the views of Peter Singer, Tom Regan and Bernard Rollin on animal ethics, I analyze the flaws in their reasoning and argue that my own view provides a stronger account for the direct moral consideration of animals. This is due to my inclusion of agency, selfhood and autonomy, which these philosophers mainly neglect. I review some current reinterpretations of Kant’s moral arguments that claim animals ought to be considered ends-in-themselves. I present reasons why the inclusion of selfhood would strengthen this claim and further develop my argument for respecting the autonomy of animals. I conclude that a theory of animal ethics based on agency, selfhood and autonomy provides the strongest account for the direct moral consideration of animals, as it is empirically informed and provides a moral middle path between animal welfare and animal rights.
All the World's a Stage: Fictionalism, Metaphysics, and Truth
(University of Waterloo, 2020-12-22) Beriault, Phillipe
Fictionalism has been an appealing position for many philosophers seeking to avoid controversial ontological commitments implicit in certain kinds of discourses, while also trying to account for the usefulness of those discourses. While fictionalists with respect to various domains have made impressive attempts to explain how something can be both fictional and useful, extant fitionalist views retain one problematic commitment: that there are no substantively true assertions made within such domains. My dissertation attempts to develop and defend a semantic anti-realist account of fictionalism which does not share this commitment to error theory. Diagnosing the source of the residual commitment to error theory as arising from a commitment to a particular picture of meaning, I propose that fictionalism can provide an alternative semantics that grants that such assertions can be successfully truth-stating. I begin by describing a general framework for understanding debates between realists and anti-realists in various domains - derived primarily from the work of Michael Dummett and Crispin Wright - according to which realism for a domain roughly boils down to the view that (a) our assertions in that domain, if true, represent a mind-independent reality; and (b) that we can make true assertions in that domain. The fictionalist's aversion to the ontological commitments of realism for particular domains requires a rejection of either (a) or (b). My suggestion is that fictionalists are mistaken in giving up (b), and that the work they have done to bolster their views instead provide us with the tools we need to reject (a). I consider two particular examples to illustrate my case. First, I look at Mary Leng's and Stephen Yablo's respective developments of mathematical fictionalism, both of which make important use of Kendall Walton's theory of make-believe. Contrary to Leng's and Yablo's own views, I present a case for the view that by recognizing mathematics as a sort of make-believe, fictionalism can instead be used to fashion an alternative semantics for mathematical claims, and so provide grounds for rejecting the mathematical realists' commitment to (a). Using lessons derived from the mathematical case, I develop an account of modal fictionalism that similarly outlines modal discourse as a kind of make-believe which provides an alternative, anti-realist semantics for possible worlds discourse. I conclude by moving away from particular instances of fictionalism to consider some potentially controversial consequences of my approach to fictionalism, defending the commitments to alethic and logical pluralism implicit in my view.
Anti-obesity public health vs. fat acceptance: impacts on 'fat' as a marginalized identity
(University of Waterloo, 2020-09-10) Raspopovic, Ashley
I will argue that anti-obesity public health (AOPH), with a focus on Canadian AOPH, performs three functions with respect to the fat acceptance movements (FAMs). These are as follows. Firstly, AOPH distracts by derailing FAMs’ advocation for fat justice towards matters of health and the weight-science surrounding fatness. Secondly, AOPH covers up and creates new fat stigmatizing attitudes through the use of linguistic strategies such as medicalized language and devices called figleaves, which resonate with the public precisely because they enact deeply entrenched cultural themes of healthism. Lastly, AOPH attempts to eradicate fatness and thus fat-positive identities, which effectively aims to eliminate a valuable marginalized perspective, and epistemically disadvantages society as a result. Chapter 1 examines the content of the Canadian AOPH’s latest (2011) Obesity in Canada report, which contains a skew in favour of a dominant and problematic discourse on ‘fat’ as interchangeable with ‘unhealthy’ and therefore objectionable, representing a pervasive mode of shaping FAMs’ discourse that facilitates the derailment towards talk of health, weight science, and economic burden. Chapter 2 focuses on linguistic devices called anti-fat figleaves, which are statements or symbols that work to obscure fat stigmatizing speech acts, behaviours, or actions. These linguistic devices, in conjunction with a healthist cultural backdrop that elevates health to a supervalue and stigmatizes illness, work to reinforce anti-fat attitudes and fat discrimination, as disseminated by AOPH. Chapter 3 examines how the first two functions of AOPH, to distract fat justice and cover up fat stigma, shape and work to eradicate fat identity, using a model of marginalized identity formation to demonstrate this disruption and eradication of fat identity. I conclude that while there is a promising increase in focus on the harms of fat stigma and acknowledgement of fat autonomy in medicine, much more work needs to be done to do away with a weight-centred healthcare paradigm that reinforces fat discrimination through over-emphasis on obesity prevention and eradication.
Authenticity and Enhancement
(University of Waterloo, 2016-10-31) Gee, Catherine
Wanting to change ourselves is nothing new; the means with which we are able to do so are. With our ever-advancing technology, the physical and mental aspects of ourselves that we can target and change are continually increasing. However, enhancement technologies are met with some hesitation: just because we can do something, it does not mean that we should. This dissertation will focus on one such reason that these technologies ought to be rejected: in certain circumstances these enhanced changes are incompatible with authenticity. There are various types of enhancements, but the ones I will focus on in this project are psychological enhancements that are aimed at improving one’s personality or character traits. These types of enhancements often pose a more difficult challenge to authenticity than those that do not target fundamental aspects of the self. I will focus on the effects the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor Prozac (fluoxetine) can have on people who are not clinically depressed and take Prozac for enhancement purposes. On Prozac, the habitually timid are given social confidence, the sensitive become brash, and the drug seems to “lend the introvert the social skills of a salesman” (Kramer 1997, xii). Prozac appears to transform some individuals and profoundly challenge their notions of the self and as such gives rise to authenticity-related worries. While Prozac will serve as the main example, I will show that these worries apply to a range of other psychological interventions as well. I argue that in many cases psychological enhancements that are aimed at improving one’s character or personality traits are incompatible with authenticity and this incompatibility is a reason to reject these types of enhancements. This does not mean that we are not able to change, just that we must do so through authentic methods that reveal and bring us closer to our true selves, such as introspection, meditation, journaling, and therapy. The difference between authentic and inauthentic change is that the former is the result of the exertion of the will, while the latter bypasses the will and the change is brought about via the enhancement itself thus rendering the user inauthentic. The sacrifice a person makes by forfeiting her authenticity by enhancing herself is real loss to her in important ways, and this is an independent reason not to enhance even when the enhancement may have other benefits, or other costs.
Autism Spectrum Disorders: A Case Study in Causation and Explanation in Psychiatric Conditions
(University of Waterloo, 2014-01-28) Finn, Tracy
This thesis discusses epistemological and ethical issues in classifi cation and diagnosisof psychiatric conditions, and briefly discusses realism about psychiatric conditions. I use autism spectrum disorder (ASD) as a case study to examine whether the explanatory and predictive power of classi fication and diagnosis could be improved if psychiatry adopts a cause-based framework in place of a symptom-based framework. However, there is signifi cant debate regarding the sort of explanatory pattern that will adequately represent the complex causation involved in psychiatric conditions. I develop a preliminary list of criteria for adequate explanatory patterns in psychiatry, and use these criteria to analyze explanations of ASD. I show that explanatory patterns unable to meet these criteria limit the validity and reliability of diagnosis. However, I argue that an integrated pattern that includes biological, cognitive and social levels of explanation may meet the criteria. Thus, diagnosis of ASD could improve if psychiatry adopted a cause-based framework informed by an intergrated explanation pattern. More accurate diagnosis of ASD may allow earlier access to Intensive Behaviourial Intervention/Applied Behavioural Analysis treatment programs, which may increase the effectiveness of this treatment and reduce the amount of resources individuals with ASD require from governments over their lifespans. Explaining these conditions using an integrated pattern of explanation can further challenge myths regarding the causes of ASD, and may provide support for Canadian lawsuits petitioning for expanded public funding of IBI/ABA programs.
Autonomy and Moral Obligation: People with Intellectual or Developmental Disabilities
(University of Waterloo, 2015-10-05) Klausen, Catherine
In this project I seek to evaluate how social structures and attitudinal norms impact the autonomy of people who live with intellectual or developmental disabilities, and what implications arise from that evaluation. I argue that this particular demographic experiences restriction to autonomy in a way that generates moral obligation for society to mitigate. I then investigate the possibility of a service called Independent Facilitation and Planning as a contemporary example of how the province of Ontario can meet that obligation.
Beyond Considering Surrogates’ Reports at ‘Face Value’: Theorizing and Contextualizing the Autonomy-Related Threats of Surrogacy Arrangements
(University of Waterloo, 2022-09-08) Mackenzie-Freeman, Susannah
As research on surrogacy in Canada is only emerging, this thesis seeks to incite discussion relating to the autonomy of surrogates by analyzing recent studies which capture the experiences of surrogates through surveys and interviews. Much of the current literature on surrogacy focuses on issues around commercialization which are less applicable to Canada where surrogacy is altruistic. Moreover, many scholars have either discussed the autonomy of surrogates only from a theoretical perspective, neglecting surrogates’ personal accounts, or have assumed that the reports of surrogates should be considered at ‘face value.’ Ultimately, I show how the reports of surrogates should be acknowledged but it is also important to consider contextual factors, such as whether the reports may be influenced and shaped by the constraints of surrogacy arrangements. While the reports of surrogates reveal the ways surrogates experience and often manage and resist autonomy-related threats, and in turn call into question theoretical concerns about surrogates lacking autonomy and power, certain theoretical concerns remain which are not identified in the studies, either because of empirical limitations or a failure to engage with them. Overall, my discussion is action guiding: I aim to shape emerging scholarship on surrogacy, so that it accounts for the complexity and nuances of surrogates’ experiences, and I gesture to certain policy interventions which follow from my discussion.
Broadening the Scope of Engaged Philosophy of Science: An Empirical Analysis of Context-Dependent Barriers
(University of Waterloo, 2021-01-07) Michaud, Janet
Philosophers of science have increasingly been discussing the social and scientific relevance of philosophy over the last decade. These discussions have included philosophy’s role in addressing scientific problems, clarifying scientific concepts, contributing to science policy, analyzing the role for social and ethical values in science, and more. I refer to this work as broadly engaged philosophy of science. While attention to this work is growing, scholars continue to point out that philosophy of science is not as connected to science and society as it could (or should) be, and that engaged approaches are undervalued. Philosophers debate about which research methods and areas of research in philosophy of science are legitimately philosophical, which communities philosophers of science should and should not engage with, and just how collaborative philosophers of science ought to be with communities outside of their own. In this dissertation, I analyze key reasons why socially and scientifically relevant work seems to remain marginalized in philosophy of science. Moreover, I explore how narrow conceptions of philosophy of science limit engagement with scientifically-relevant domains and ultimately harm the discipline. Until now, philosophers have been largely discussing engagement from academic philosophy outward to scientifically relevant domains. Even in cases where philosophers of science are arguing for more engaged relationships between philosophical and scientific communities, philosophers are entrenched in conceptions of philosophy as synonymous with academia. However, in parallel, philosophers of colour have been critiquing traditional methods in philosophy as being hostile to diverse practitioners and limiting philosophy’s ability to respond to relevant questions. I challenge this predominant conception by highlighting an approach to engaged philosophy of science wherein philosophers are directly embedded in scientifically relevant domains – i.e., philosophers are employed in government agencies and industry science settings. I also use empirical methods to explore the barriers that prevent broadly engaged philosophy of science from being appropriately valued and rewarded despite its benefits to philosophy, as well as science and society. Then, I argue for the need to develop solutions that are responsive to institutional, departmental, and disciplinary contexts. I offer empirically-informed possibilities for intervening in this historical pattern so that we can recognize the value of this work and support it.
Can Induction Strengthen Inference to the Best Explanation?
(University of Waterloo, 2008-08-28T14:45:57Z) Thomson, Neil A.
In this paper I will argue that the controversial process of inferring to the best explanation (IBE) can be made more coherent if its formulation recognizes and includes a significant inductive component. To do so, I will examine the relationship between Harman’s, Lipton’s, and Fumerton’s positions on IBE, settling ultimately upon a conception that categorically rejects Harman’s account while appropriating potions of both Lipton’s and Fumerton’s accounts. The resulting formulation will be called inductive-IBE, and I will argue that this formulation more accurately describes the inferential practices employed in scientific inquiry. The upshot of my argument, that IBE contains a significant inductive component, will be that any conclusion born from such types of inductive inference must be, at best, likely, and not a necessity. And, although previous accounts of IBE have accepted the defeasibility of IBE, I will argue that inductive-IBE is more descriptive because it tells us why this fallibility exists. That is, although the Liptonian conception of IBE acknowledges that IBE is fallible, my account specifically addresses this characteristic and, thus, is more descriptive and informative in this regard. I will use inductive-IBE to argue, contra van Fraassen, that IBE can be a legitimate form of inference that leads science to true theories and real entities.
Coercion, Authority, and Democracy
(University of Waterloo, 2009-04-27T18:13:04Z) Booker, Grahame
As a classical liberal, or libertarian, I am concerned to advance liberty and minimize coercion. Indeed on this view liberty just is the absence of coercion or costs imposed on others. In order to better understand the notion of coercion I discuss Robert Nozick's classic essay on the subject as well as more recent contributions. I then address the question of whether law is coercive, and respond to Edmundson and others who think that it isn't. Assuming that the law is in fact coercive, there is still a question,as with all coercive acts, as to whether that coercion is justified. Edmundson thinks that this places a special burden on the state of justifying its existence, whereas it simply places the same burden on the state as anyone else. What I reject is the longstanding doctrine of Staatsrason, namely that the state is not subject to the same moral rules as its subjects. With respect to the relation of morality to law, Edmundson thought that another of the fallacies of which philosophical anarchists were guilty was that of assuming that there was a sphere of morality where law had no business. On the contrary, our concern is with spheres of law which appear to have little to do with morality, which is to say laws against wrongs of the malum prohibitum variety, as opposed to wrongs which are malum in se. I then turn to a matter with which Edmundson begins his study, namely how it is that states acquire the authority to do what they do, namely coerce their subjects. While the fact that the philosopher's stone of political obligation has proved rather elusive may mean that a legitimate state lacks the authority to demand obedience pure and simple, Edmundson contends that it can at the very least demand that we do not interfere in the administration of justice. I argue that this attempt to sidestep the justification of the authority of the state fails and that we seem in the end to be having to take the state's word for it that we must do X on pain of penalty P. Nor, as I go on to argue, is it any help to appeal to democracy to remedy a failed justification of the authority of the state. There either is a moral justification of state coercion in order to prevent harm to innocent subjects, or there isn't, and this holds,if it does, not only at the level of individuals, but also at the level of the state, regardless of its constitutional form. After concluding that the attempts of Edmundson and others to refute the anarchic turn in recent political philosophy have failed, it would seem that the withering away of the state foreseen in Marx's eschatology is not as improbable as maybe it once appeared.
Collaborative Scientific Knowledge and Testimonial Justification
(University of Waterloo, 2019-01-23) Yamamoto, Angella
Is it possible to gain justified scientific knowledge from the testimony of a collective of scientists? In this thesis, I discuss whether or not it is possible to use current theories of testimonial justification for collective scientific knowledge. Our current theories on testimony and testimonial justification give us the conditions for when it is justified to acquire knowledge from someone or something else. However, these theories on testimonial justification focus on instances of testimony between individuals. That is, current theories on testimony explain when there is testimonial justification for knowledge that passes from one individual testifier to an individual recipient. In collective scientific knowledge, I describe two kinds of testimony. There is not only testimony by the collective but testimony within the collective. My discussion comes to the conclusion that while current theories on testimonial justification could be used to describe the kinds of testimony in collective scientific knowledge, there is still more work to do. Current theories of testimonial justification do not account for the interaction between the kinds of testimony.
Commercial and Business Incorporation: Enhancing the notion of corporation to include an ethical statement
(University of Waterloo, 2008-01-22T14:03:54Z) Ackroyd, Vaughan Richard
Today’s modern, Canadian, business corporations are hugely influential in determining public policy and many aspects of people’s lives. Because this influence permeates so much of our social construct, we expect corporations to act in an ethical manner. Yet, at the very baseline of legal incorporation, there is not a requirement for corporations, per se, to be ethical or to act in an ethical manner. This situation has set up a form of ethical dualism, with individual citizens being required to act in certain prescribed manners, while corporations, which in most cases comprise individual citizens, are allowed to ignore or even to flaunt similar ethical rules and standards. In this investigative paper on corporate applied ethics, I will examine arguments for and against the notion of including ethical responsibility statements within the concept of incorporation. This paper will provide a historical framework in which to view some of the complexities involved, and examine certain influential assertions made by Milton Friedman. The paper will begin with a look at what is meant by corporation in this context. This will be followed by an analysis of the arguments put forward by Milton Friedman in his famous essay “The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Profits” and other related arguments. These other arguments, as objections to the inclusion of ethics within the notion of corporation, fall into three main types: objections to concept; to ability; and to process. I will review each in turn, with the hope that, by dispelling the Friedmanian arguments against corporate ethical inclusion, a new baseline for incorporation might be established. The second part of the paper will examine what kind of ethics might best suit the corporation. It will also consider ethical growth with respect to business. The paper will conclude with a suggestion as to how the inclusion of ethics within the notion of incorporation might be accomplished.
Common Sense Within the Bounds of Philosophy: Reid’s Philosophy of Common Sense Defended
(University of Waterloo, 2009-10-02T16:08:44Z) Skelton, Edward
I proffer a defense Reid’s Philosophy of Common Sense. I address the initial implausibility that greets most all of us when we stop to consider the prospects for common sense as guide to knowledge and inquiry. I argue that this initial implausibility is based upon a misapprehension of what Reid understands by common sense. I address the justification of common sense. I argue that common sense is justified, even if we cannot give a reason for it. I present an expansion and refinement of Reid’s notion of common sense as what we must take for granted.
Communal Inferentialism: Charles S. Peirce’s Critique of Epistemic Individualism
(University of Waterloo, 2019-12-09) MacDonald, Ian
Charles S. Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism, the attempt to make the individual the locus of knowledge, is a dominant theme in his writings. While scholars often mention this critique, there is, surprisingly, a lack of research on the topic. However, it is necessary to know what motivates Peirce’s critique of epistemic individualism to know why he aims to turn philosophy into a communal study. In this dissertation, I defend the claim that Peirce’s communal inferentialism allows us to assess the rational merits of his critique of epistemic individualism and to grasp his insights into why philosophy must change its course. The questions that have guided the research are the following. What are the central reasons that support Peirce’s verdict that epistemic individualism is a dead-end for philosophy? What roles do Peirce’s fundamental commitments concerning the notion of the community of inquirers and the patterns of correct inference play in his critique? I defend the central claim in four chapters. In Chapter One, I reinvestigate Peirce’s critique in relation to Cartesianism, while in Chapter Two I take up Peirce’s case against nominalism. I begin with these topics since Peirce claims that these two positions in the history of philosophy are prime examples of epistemic individualism. In Chapter Three and Chapter Four, I show that the problem of epistemic individualism crops up again in Peirce’s two most influential papers, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear.” I provide a communal inferentialist reading of both papers. In this dissertation, I further show why, according to Peirce, our key epistemic notions, including knowledge and truth, cannot be individualistic but must be communal notions.
A Compatible Defense of Respect for Autonomy and Medical Paternalism in the Context of Mental Capacity on the Grounds of Authenticity
(University of Waterloo, 2009-09-30T18:06:44Z) Abdool, Rosalind
Respect for autonomy has become the guiding principle at the forefront of health-care decision-making. In an attempt to preserve this principle, patients can be neglected to make decisions for themselves during times when they cannot make fully capable decisions. Under certain circumstances, it is necessary to have others assist a patient in making decisions that may have a significant impact on the patient’s life and, will ultimately, respect the patient's prior expressed capable wishes and values. This thesis aims to provide arguments in favor of both respect for autonomy and medical paternalism under very specific circumstances. It provides traditional, contemporary and psychological arguments in support of respect for autonomy. Several key arguments in favor of medical paternalism are also presented on the grounds of the loss of personal identity, a social insurance policy and the abandonment of vulnerable patients. Furthermore, the difficulties involved in both accounts are also discussed with respect to the idealization of autonomy and the potential abuses involved in medical paternalism. This thesis concludes through drawing upon the notion of an authentic self as applied to this discussion, allowing for a compatible defense of these two traditionally competing theories.
Conceptual Change: Gods, Elements, and Water
(University of Waterloo, 2010-09-30T22:42:02Z) Grisdale, Christopher
On what does the meaning of the concept of water depend? I consider three possible answers: the physical world, theory, or both the physical world and theory. Each answer supports a particular history. If the history unique to an answer is confirmed by the actual history of the concept of water, then there is supporting evidence for that account of meaning. I have documented the historical development of the concept of water, focusing on three periods: the ancient Greeks, the 18th and 19th centuries, and the 20th and 21st centuries. Conceptual change figures prominently in that history, and when enough historical data are available communication across theories is obvious. Those features suggest that the meaning of the concept of water depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded. The physical world explains cross theory communication; and theory accounts for the conceptual changes that I have documented. The history of the concept of water suggests that Putnam (1975) is right: meaning depends on the physical world and the theory in which it is embedded. He’s right, however, for the wrong reasons. Putnam relies on a thought experiment to demonstrate that the physical world contributes to meaning, but the history suggests that he built some chemically implausible assumptions into that thought experiment.
Conservative Contractarianism
(University of Waterloo, 2004) Watson, Terrence
Moral contractarianism, as demonstrated in the work of David Gauthier, is an attempt to derive moral principles from the non-moral premises of rational choice. However, this contractarian enterprise runs aground because it is unable to show that agents would commit to norms in a fairly realistic world where knowledge is limited in space and time, where random shocks are likely, and where agents can be arbitrarily differentiated from one another. In a world like this, agents will find that the most "rational" strategy is to behave "non-rationally," imitating the behavior of others in their vicinity and preserving a limited sort of ignorance.
A Constructive Critical Assessment of Feminist Evolutionary Psychology
(University of Waterloo, 2017-12-21) Weaver, Sara
In this dissertation, I develop an approach to philosophical critique of morally relevant science and apply this approach to a new branch of evolutionary psychology called “feminist evolutionary psychology.” Morally relevant science is science that produces knowledge that has the potential to risk harm to humans, non-humans, or the environment. For example, a science that produces claims about women that reinforce prejudicial beliefs about women is a morally relevant science. The approach I develop, what I call the “social-dimensional approach,” is designed to assess a science’s epistemic and ethical dimensions which makes it ideal for the assessment of morally relevant science. My development of the social-dimensional approach is informed by an analysis of the philosophy of biology literature on the criticism of evolutionary psychology (EP), the study of the evolution of human psychology and behaviour. I apply the social-dimensional approach to feminist evolutionary psychology and show that this new science has serious epistemic and ethical flaws. I address the implications of these flaws and offer recommendations for how feminist evolutionary psychologists can amend them. I argue the social-dimensional approach has use beyond evolutionary psychology and can be used for the assessment of morally relevant science more broadly.
A Contemporary Examination of the A Fortiori Argument Involving Jewish Traditions
(University of Waterloo, 2010-02-22T18:24:37Z) Wiseman, Allen
This study proposes to clarify the a fortiori argument’s components, structure, definitions, formulations, and logical status, as well as the specific conditions under which it is to be employed, both generally and in a Jewish context. Typically, the argument claims this: if a lesser (or greater) case has a feature, a correspondingly greater (or lesser) case has that feature too. While evident in ancient thought, the argument is often central to Jewish deliberations that may continue for centuries; so this Jewish use forms the main context and material of this study. However, as general reasoning employs the argument, tracing its common forms helps to delineate its terms and relations. While the argument aspires to be true and it can be deductively valid in those cases where heritable properties recur, it is more likely to be inductively probable. In any case, the thesis presents a number of deductive formalizations, while more complex treatments are left to the appendix or further study. Inasmuch as the a fortiori is claimed to be a type of analogy, both its likenesses and its differences are set out and exemplified in a number of comparative mathematical, practical, legal, and other formats. Once the conclusion’s feature is deductively valid or inductively likely, the amount that one accords to the feature in the new case needs to be determined. Logically, the a fortiori’s conclusion can be either limited to the same feature given in one of its premises or else proportioned to it in a way that suits both premises. Mathematically, the same outcome is just one possible ratio. However, the early Jewish stand of the Mishnah usually retains the same tradition or least onerous result as sufficient (the dayo) for the new case. A detailed analysis covers this and later Rabbinic use, and especially Maccoby’s recent claim that the same given alone is correct, which I show to be extreme, for even in a Jewish context it generates several problems. When one includes sensible a fortiori proportions and the possibility of mercy, good moral reasoning can be reconciled with true religious values and traditional precedents. In all, the conclusion’s amount, particularly in practical issues, involves an extra decision procedure that considers the relevant factors of the actual case. Once the a fortiori’s informal and formal aspects are dealt with adequately and its fallacious uses avoided, the argument’s overall reasonableness is better appreciated.
Contextualizing Science for Value-Conscious Communication
(University of Waterloo, 2019-07-15) Branch-Smith, Teresa Yolande
Democracy hinges on the personal and civic decision-making capabilities of publics. In our increasingly technoscientific world, being well-informed requires an understanding of science. Despite acknowledging public understanding of science as an important part of being well-informed, publics’ engagement with science remains limited. I argue that part of publics’ disengagement with science is because information transmitted about science, like science itself, has been decontextualized. Though there are many ways to decontextualize information, obscuring values in science is a popular means of doing so. Due to the ubiquitous nature of values, science misrepresented as ‘value-free’ will be the focus of my decontextualization critique. Epistemic values (intrinsically important for connecting scientific observations to reality) and non-epistemic values (linked to ethical, social, political and personal concerns) are the sorts of values that have been misrepresented by views like the value-free ideal (VFI). The VFI is the idea that non-epistemic values should not play a role in the evaluation of evidence and has been heavily criticized on practical and normative grounds. This has led to alternatives to the VFI being proposed, including ways for non-epistemic values to be included in the evaluation of evidence. In a yet to be explored implication of the VFI, I argue that models of science education and communication that accommodate the VFI have been popularized as a way to reinforce decontextualization. These models describe science and publics with only a minimal account of values, leading me to challenge them on practical and normative grounds since communicating science as ‘value-free’ is misrepresentative, and from a normative perspective undesirable, especially as including values can help engage publics. In response, I advocate for value-conscious descriptions of science instead. To catalyze this contextualization, I introduce key aspects for understanding values in science (based on alternatives to the VFI) and call them the ‘KAUVIS’. By using a basis of transparency between scientists and publics, the KAUVIS provides a means to describe how values interact with science without dictating which values are the correct ones. The KAUVIS includes descriptions of the roles values take on, how values relate to the goals of research, and considers epistemic and ethical (non-epistemic) values. Hence, the KAUVIS can more accurately represent science than the VFI, and in so doing, contextualizes information about science in relation to research goals and social needs, making science more engaging. By developing the KAUVIS to describe values, I also show that traditional information transmission models are maladapted to conveying the true value- laden nature of science. As a consequence, I examine more value-conscious communication models which I show to be enhanced by the descriptive detail of the KAUVIS. However, unveiling the inner workings of values in science may also have negative consequences for how publics interpret and engage with science. After all, exposing values in science can lead to further dispute about science. Hence, the KAUVIS opens up questions like, what (if anything) is lost by divulging values in science? My initiatory examination of the drawbacks of being explicit about values will uncover that even though there is a risk that publics may reject scientific claims, an understanding of values in science is desirable for decision-making and deliberation. In other words, a description of values can serve to clarify how they are being used, and help define what it is we are in disagreement about. Thus, by more accurately representing science and values, we might strengthen democracy by better providing publics the contextualized information they need for science to be of service.

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