Philosophy

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This is the collection for the University of Waterloo's Department of Philosophy.

Research outputs are organized by type (eg. Master Thesis, Article, Conference Paper).

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Now showing 1 - 9 of 9

Authenticity and Enhancement
(University of Waterloo, 2016-10-31) Gee, Catherine; Doucet, Mathieu
Wanting to change ourselves is nothing new; the means with which we are able to do so are. With our ever-advancing technology, the physical and mental aspects of ourselves that we can target and change are continually increasing. However, enhancement technologies are met with some hesitation: just because we can do something, it does not mean that we should. This dissertation will focus on one such reason that these technologies ought to be rejected: in certain circumstances these enhanced changes are incompatible with authenticity. There are various types of enhancements, but the ones I will focus on in this project are psychological enhancements that are aimed at improving one’s personality or character traits. These types of enhancements often pose a more difficult challenge to authenticity than those that do not target fundamental aspects of the self. I will focus on the effects the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor Prozac (fluoxetine) can have on people who are not clinically depressed and take Prozac for enhancement purposes. On Prozac, the habitually timid are given social confidence, the sensitive become brash, and the drug seems to “lend the introvert the social skills of a salesman” (Kramer 1997, xii). Prozac appears to transform some individuals and profoundly challenge their notions of the self and as such gives rise to authenticity-related worries. While Prozac will serve as the main example, I will show that these worries apply to a range of other psychological interventions as well. I argue that in many cases psychological enhancements that are aimed at improving one’s character or personality traits are incompatible with authenticity and this incompatibility is a reason to reject these types of enhancements. This does not mean that we are not able to change, just that we must do so through authentic methods that reveal and bring us closer to our true selves, such as introspection, meditation, journaling, and therapy. The difference between authentic and inauthentic change is that the former is the result of the exertion of the will, while the latter bypasses the will and the change is brought about via the enhancement itself thus rendering the user inauthentic. The sacrifice a person makes by forfeiting her authenticity by enhancing herself is real loss to her in important ways, and this is an independent reason not to enhance even when the enhancement may have other benefits, or other costs.
Controlling Cyberwarfare: International Laws of Armed Conflict and Human Rights in the Cyber Realm
(University of Waterloo, 2021-06-04) Jordan, W. Jim; Doucet, Mathieu
Cyberwarfare, military activities in cyberspace conducted by a state against another state and intended to disrupt or destroy computing or communication systems or data, is a recent addition to the warfaring arsenal. The international laws of armed conflict set out an obligation for states at war to protect civilians from the effects of the conflict. As societies continue to expand their activities in the cyber realm, the risk of cyberwarfare negatively affecting the civilian population increases. The international community, recognizing this risk, is engaged in a political dance trying to identify the constraints that international law already places on cyberwarfare while staking out ground to preserve its effectiveness as a means of influencing other states’ policies. This dissertation project addresses some of the problems posed by the use of computing and network technology as weapons and targets in the context of international armed conflict. It brings together material drawn from computing technology, military handbooks, policy research, international standards for records preservation, nongovernment organizations, international humanitarian law, international human rights law, the international laws of armed conflict, and real-world examples to reveal the complexity and nuances of using operations in cyberspace to produce effects in meatspace, the physical world of humans, buildings, equipment, and artefacts. First, I argue that since there is no significant difference between using cyber means of war and conventional means of war, it is appropriate to treat developments in cyberwarfare under the existing international laws of armed conflict. Then I introduce the Tallinn Manual, a handbook on the international law applicable to cyber operations, and the events that led to its development. I examine how well the Tallinn Manual documents the protections, prohibitions, and permissions extended under the laws of armed conflict, concluding that it is a faithful interpretation of international law. The application of international law to warfare is always messy and imprecise. Its application to cyberwarfare is no different. This does not mean that the constraints of international law are without value or purpose. On the assumption that no state wants to start an international armed conflict, but is prepared to respond to uses of force, I apply some of the principles expressed in the Tallinn Manual to establish qualitative assessments of the severity of initial aggressive cyberoperations against a state, classifying them as moderate or flagrant attacks depending on the harm they produced. This helps the target state determine whether there is just cause for a use of force, either cyber or conventional, in response, and the constraints that apply to any response that may be permissible under international law. International law also affords protections for human rights, both in peace time and during times of conflict. I argue that cyberwarfare exposes more civilian objects, including objects of cultural significance and records needed to safeguard human rights, to harm through both conventional and cyber attacks. If human rights are to be protected, the records (digital or otherwise) that serve as evidence in support of rights claims must be protected as well. I conclude that international law already sets out the obligation for these protections, but the interpretation of international law must make explicit the expectation that all parties in an armed conflict will make efforts to identify and preserve these objects for the wellbeing of persons in a postconflict society. Finally, I demonstrate the breadth and applicability of further work in this area. I point out some other problems that branch off from this particular project: the separation of information content from its representation in different media, human rights in the cyber domain, the use of computing and communication technology to produce social or economic disruption, the status of privately-owned satellites under the multiple international treaties and conventions during times of armed conflict, and the assignment of peacetime responsibility for safeguarding data essential for the protection and provision of human rights.
A Defense of the Public Health-Quarantine Model of Punishment in Light of Obligations of the State to the Wrongdoer
(University of Waterloo, 2017-02-22) Bohner, Eric Nicholas; Doucet, Mathieu
Punishment is traditionally justified retributively or consequentially; that is, with respect to the desert of the wrongdoer or the positive consequences of the punishment. State-sanctioned punishment (the kind of punishment that is administered by the state to those who break the law), I find, cannot be justified in these traditional ways. In the first two chapters of this thesis I take a detailed look at these traditional theories of punishment and point out several strong moral objections which provide reason to believe they do not sufficiently justify punishment. In the next chapter, I argue that punishment can only be morally justified as a last resort of keeping society safe, as described in the Public Health-Quarantine Model of Punishment (PHQ model). That is, punishment can only be justified insofar as it is necessary for ensuring the safety of individuals in a society. Even then, however, I argue in the fourth chapter that the state creates an obligation to the wrongdoer when it punishes her for breaking the law. This obligation, I argue, is best fulfilled by providing every reasonable opportunity to assist with the wrongdoer’s rehabilitation into society. By taking seriously my recommendation of ensuring the health of the wrongdoer, I provide an interpretation of the PHQ model which avoids the “mere means” objection to punishment. That is, it ensures that wrongdoers are not merely used as a means of promoting the general wellbeing of society, but are treated as autonomous individuals who deserve the respect that is required of all people. Most importantly, it ensures that dangerous wrongdoers who are incarcerated for the safety of society are helped as quickly and efficiently as possible, similar to the way in which we are obligated to treat those with dangerously infectious diseases who are quarantined to ensure they cannot unintentionally harm others. By ensuring wrongdoers are treated this way, the PHQ model of punishment cannot lose sight of the needs of the individual in favour of the greater good for society. In that way, my argument that state-sanctioned punishment entails an obligation to the wrongdoers, actually strengthens the PHQ model from some common (and often damning) objections to the justification of punishment.
Ethical Leadership for Machiavellians in Business
(University of Waterloo, 2016-10-13) Lam, Vanessa; Doucet, Mathieu
Despite some progress in instilling ethics into business practice, businesses continue to make decisions that result in incredible harms to people and the environment around the world. Academics, the public, and the media have often singled out business leaders as unethical and responsible for the vast harms that their companies have done. As a result, some have looked to ethical business leadership as one avenue of approach to making businesses act more ethically. This thesis explores two leadership styles. The first is Machiavellian leadership, which has a reputation for being one of the least ethical leadership styles, and the second is transformational leadership, which has a reputation for being one of the most ethical leadership styles. This thesis attempts to align the ethical components of transformational leadership with Machiavellian leadership so that Machiavellian leaders will have reason to behave more ethically. The hope is that some component of transformational leadership theory can inspire Machiavellian leaders to behave more ethically. However, I argue that transformational leadership is not as ethical as it seems, since transformational leadership can result in both ethical and unethical behaviours. Ultimately, I conclude that there is nothing in transformational leadership theory that can inspire Machiavellian leaders to behave more ethically. The frightening implications of this conclusion are discussed.
Genetic Renaissance: A Legal, Philosophical, and Ethical Examination of Consent Using Autonomy & Privacy in Genetic Testing
(University of Waterloo, 2023-09-28) Fedjki, Kawthar; Doucet, Mathieu
Genetic testing has gained traction in the media with the recent Pentagon ban and continuing increases in public consumption of at-home tests. Public discourse surrounding this technology prompts further exploration of the multifaceted parameters that govern its use. This thesis takes on the task of analyzing and dissecting these comprehensive features, with a specific focus on the legal, philosophical, and ethical aspects of the matrix of genetic testing. It aims to understand the application of these layers to the different contexts of genetic testing: the clinical and research contexts, as well as the direct-to-consumer context. By examining the process of genetic testing, from obtaining informed consent and collecting samples to the interpretation and communication of results, this project aims to understand all the dimensions involved. The most prevalent dimensions are autonomy, privacy, and ownership, and it is this trifecta which is most impactful on informed consent. The examination will begin by providing an overview of the technical science behind genetic testing, to better understand the uses of this biotechnology in each of the contexts (i.e. clinical, research, and direct-to-consumer). Understanding this will allow for a smooth transition into an extensive outline of the legal, philosophical and ethical concepts that are tied to informed consent. This thesis focuses on laws and policies that are applicable in the United States of America and Canada, although there are many international regulations that vary in severity and depth. These legal frameworks essentially delineate how persons should be treated across contexts, including specific regulations surrounding how informed consent must be obtained, how samples must be stored or retained, and how personal data (e.g. genetic testing results) can be used and protected. Following from this legal backdrop, a literary and historical evaluation of informed consent is outlined to establish just how foundational it is to bioethics. And essential to this are the philosophical principles of autonomy, privacy, and ownership. Although most of the thesis will focus on established frameworks, it will raise questions about the fundamental issues that plague these concepts, including the lack of consideration of collectives in consent and ownership, and the inconsistent protocols involved in direct-to-consumer testing that allow for major trespasses on personal rights by corporations that are not required to operate as healthcare institutions. In exposing these weaknesses, this thesis does not necessarily seek to provide concrete solutions for such large problems, but rather to suggest possible criteria for solutions going forward. The main point this thesis seeks to show is that despite the huge strides in biotechnology, there is still substantial space for improvement in bioethics, with specific focus on the development of policies and legislations that can capture the nature of consent across social and testing contexts. This kind of work towards ameliorating the essential legal, philosophical, and ethical aspects is essential for ensuring the protection and empowerment of individual and collective rights, especially in emerging fields such as genetic testing, where the current frameworks are inadequately suited for comprehensive coverage.
Mature Minor Eligibility for Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD): An Ethical Analysis
(University of Waterloo, 2021-08-24) Morrison, Kathryn; Doucet, Mathieu
Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) was legalized in Canada on June 17, 2016, following a landmark Supreme Court of Canada decision, Carter v. Canada (2015). Currently, the law controversially denies three groups access to MAiD: mature minors (capable children under 18), persons making advance directives, and persons with mental illness as a sole underlying condition. All three populations are excluded from access to MAiD on the grounds that they may lack the capacity to autonomously request and consent to the procedure. This Applied Philosophy Dissertation examines the prospect of extending MAiD eligibility to one of these vulnerable populations, mature minors. The question of MAiD presents conflicting legal and ethical obligations to children. One obligation is to child welfare. We have stronger duties – including legal duties – to protect children’s interests than those of adults, and we organize society such that children are treated differently to shield them as a vulnerable group. Yet we also have obligations to child self-determination. Children have a legal right to decision-making autonomy corresponding to their level of maturity. This tension between welfare and self-determination hinges in part on whether children can make genuinely autonomous choices, a source of considerable debate among child development experts. The dissertation argues that eligibility for MAiD should be calibrated according to maturity rather than age. It develops three key arguments for this conclusion. One is that an age criterion in Bill C-14 is an unjustifiable act of age discrimination. Children who are otherwise eligible for MAiD suffer to the same extent as adults, and are disadvantaged compared to adults where they cannot end this suffering on their own terms. Secondly, prohibiting mature minors from accessing MAiD does not protect their welfare, and may be harmful in cases where requests are motivated by severe pain and suffering, a low quality of life, and an unwillingness to endure continued indignities. Thirdly, the law treats mature minors inconsistently by permitting minors to refuse life-sustaining treatment, for example, a blood transfusion on religious grounds, yet prohibiting them from consenting to MAiD. This legal inconsistency is also an ethical inconsistency: mature minors are able to choose to die when they could otherwise live, yet they are unable to control how they die when their death is unavoidable.
Supporting Palliative Care in a Post-Carter World
(University of Waterloo, 2020-12-15) O'Donnell, Caitlin; Doucet, Mathieu
Traditionally, most Palliative Care physicians have adhered to the World Health Organization’s definition of Palliative Care, according to which it “intends neither to hasten nor postpone death.” The 2016 legalization of Medical Assistance in Dying (MAiD) in Canada, however, has thrown this understanding into question, and has forced Palliative Care physicians to reconceive their role in caring for patients who experience intolerable suffering. The role of Palliative Care in MAiD, in particular, has provoked intense debate amongst Canadian Palliative Care physicians and their representative organizations. In November of 2019, three national organizations—the Canadian Society of Palliative Care Physicians (CSPCP) in conjunction with the Canadian Hospice and Palliative Care Association (CHPCA), and the Canadian Association of MAiD Assessors and Providers (CAMAP)—each issued conflicting policy statements that addressed the role of Palliative Care in MAiD. The CSPCP and the CHPCA distanced the practice of Palliative Care from MAiD, arguing that MAiD differs substantially from Palliative Care in “philosophy, intention, and approach,” and should not be considered part of Palliative medicine. Alternatively, CAMAP strongly advocated for the integration of MAiD and Palliative Care to support the needs of patients. This national divide caused distress amongst the Palliative Care community, as many physicians are still deciding how they will continue to respond to MAiD, and are turning to their professional organizations for guidance. Given this sharp division, my dissertation aims to understand two things: first, the challenges that Palliative Care and its physicians face in the era of MAiD, and second, the best way of conceiving of the relationship between Palliative Care and MAiD. In order to advance this conceptual understanding, I conducted interviews with 51 Palliative Care physicians. This dissertation is grounded in the voices of those physicians who have a particular, nuanced understanding of Palliative Care practice, and what supports it needs going forward. It is from these interviews that I offer systems and policy recommendations that are designed to support Palliative Care overall, and those whom it serves.
The Co-Participants Model for Fetal Involvement in Research
(University of Waterloo, 2024-09-16) Woodward, Leanne; Doucet, Mathieu
Research during pregnancy currently lags behind other types of research. Langston (2016) attributes a large portion of this issue to hesitancy by Research Ethics Boards (REBs) to approve research involving pregnant people because it is not always clear how the risks and benefits can be balanced between the parent and fetus when their interests may come in conflict. Authors such as Wild and Biller-Andorno (2016) have emphasized that one major reason that it is difficult to balance these risks and benefits is that the status of the fetus in research is unknown. By answering the question of the status of the fetus in various research contexts, we can reduce the hesitancy of researchers and REBs to pursue and approve research during pregnancy and fill in the gaps in medical knowledge in a safe, ethical manner. I argue that, based on conceptual understandings of terms like “subject” and “participant,” fetuses can fit the role of a research subject when their data is being analyzed for research outcomes, and can therefore be considered participants under the prominent Canadian guidelines known as Tri-Council Policy Statement for Research Involving Humans (TCPS2). Since fetuses are sometimes participants, we should acknowledge them as such when appropriate and take their interests into consideration, while also ensuring that pregnancy alone is not considered a reason to focus on fetal interests. This means protecting fetal interests through proxy consent when the consent process can increase clarity about which role the parent and fetus each play in research, improving respect for the pregnant parent, and welfare for the parent and fetus. I develop the co-participants model for viewing both the pregnant parent and fetus as individual participants who are inextricably linked. This allows researchers to have obligations to the fetus in the same way they would a born child, but to still take these obligations in conjunction with the pregnant parents’ interests and consider how these needs overlap. The co-participants model is preferrable to the “fetus as a patient” model by McCullough and Chervenak (1994, p. 96), and the “double unit” model by Wild (2012, p. 91) because those models use a medical practice definition of patient, and rely on a capacity view of personhood to define participation respectively. Neither model can capture a general descriptive account of what it means to be a participant of research, blurring what that would mean for the fetus. One major objection to the change in fetal status is the perception that it elevates the moral status of the fetus and could affect vital healthcare involving pregnancy termination. The benefit of my co-participants model is that it does not rely on any argument of moral personhood to determine which beings count as participants under the TCPS2. The obligations of the researcher to the fetus begin after the pregnant parent has committed their body to the growth and development of the fetus. In cases where fetuses are imminent to termination, the researcher does not have obligations to protect fetal interests and the fetus is not a participant. The co-participants model for fetal participation is one that can be easily applied to the TCPS2’s current structure and goals, clarifies the role of the parent and fetus in studies with various levels of fetal and parental involvement, and can increase the ability for prospective participants to make informed decisions that are in the best interests of themselves and their fetuses. By using a general definition of participation that does not rely on personhood, the co-participants model ensures that the research status of the fetus does not infringe on the pregnant parent’s autonomy while still ensuring that fetal interests are adequately protected.
Utilitarian Cops: Jeremy Bentham and The Rise of Modern Policing
(University of Waterloo, 2021-10-29) Cote, Gregory; Doucet, Mathieu
It is widely accepted that modern policing first came into existence with a bill passed in 1829, establishing the Metropolitan London Police under British Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel. It is Peel after all, who has been labeled the founder of modern policing, an English institution that inspired North American police. I argue that it was Jeremy Bentham who developed an early model of modern policing and whose work on applying his utilitarian philosophy to institutional reform directly influenced Peel’s innovation. I intend to show how Bentham and reformer Patrick Colquhoun established the first modern police department when they collaborated in drafting the Thames River Police Bill adopted by Parliament in 1800, almost thirty years before Peel’s legislation. It is the Thames River Police created by Bentham and Colquhoun that is the world’s oldest, not the Metropolitan London Police introduced by Peel. John Stuart Mill once wrote that Bentham was a great subversive. And as the great subversive whose years of work on improving police was often done in secret and whose efforts were largely ignored, it is Bentham not Peel, who should be considered the single most important figure in the development of modern policing.

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Browsing Philosophy by Author "Doucet, Mathieu"