An Empirical Study of Privacy Leakage Vulnerability in Third-Party Android Logs Libraries
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Date
2025-10-21
Authors
Advisor
Shang, Weiyi
Journal Title
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Publisher
University of Waterloo
Abstract
Mobile logging libraries are essential tools for debugging and monitoring Android applications, yet their privacy implications remain largely unexplored. This paper presents the first large-scale empirical study of privacy risks in Android logging practices, analyzing 48,702 applications from Google Play to identify sensitive data leakage through third-party
logging frameworks. Our findings reveal that while logging library adoption is limited (3.4% of applications), nearly half (49.3%) of logging-enabled applications exhibit privacy leaks, creating significant security vulnerabilities. Three dominant libraries—Timber (35.2%), SLF4J (35.1%), and Firebase (29.4%)—account for 99.7% of all verified privacy leakage
instances. We identify distinct logging patterns across frameworks, with SLF4J showing balanced log level distribution, Timber concentrating heavily on DEBUG levels (78.5%), and Firebase dominated by Analytics Events (98.0%). Our analysis reveals that privacy violations predominantly stem from indirect data flows (62.5%) requiring intermediate processing steps, with most leaks occurring through moderate-complexity paths of 2-4 statements. User-info sources dominate privacy leaks (69.7%), while user-input sources represent a substantial portion (30.3%), highlighting GUI components as significant risk vectors. Longitudinal analysis of application updates demonstrates that privacy leaks tend to improve over time, indicating growing developer awareness of privacy concerns, though persistent vulnerabilities underscore the need for systematic privacy protection measures. Our study contributes the largest dataset of third-party logging-based privacy violations to date, a reproducible analysis pipeline for future research, and actionable insights for developers and library maintainers. These findings emphasize the critical need for practitioners to recognize both user information and user input as significant privacy threats when implementing third-party logging frameworks in Android applications.
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Keywords
logging practices, taint analysis, Android applications, malware detection